Germany to push nine financial reforms

Schäuble's plan

More in-depth assessments of stability and convergence programmes, possibly by the European Central Bank or a group of independent research institutions.

National parliaments should be more closely involved in EU fiscal policy so that eurozone finance ministers are held to account by national parliaments for the examination of their eurozone partners' stability programmes.

Stability and Growth Pact rules and national law
Stability and Growth pact (SGP) rules should be more firmly embedded in national budgetary planning. All eurozone countries should make a commitment to incorporate SGP rules, especially on preventive measures, into national law in a binding and credible manner. 

Sanctions
EU structural funds payments should be suspended for eurozone countries that break deficit rules. In extreme cases, the funds could be permanently lost.

Greater automaticity of stability pact rules
Eurozone countries that have extremely high government debt or persistent excessive deficits should make extra efforts to consolidate their budgets and be subjected to an accelerated excessive deficit procedure under the SGP. The medium-term budgetary objectives could be used as binding targets for member states whose debt exceeds 60% of gross domestic product. Any eurozone country that reports an excessive deficit more than once within a fixed period (for example, five years) will pass on to the next stage of the procedure more quickly.

Voting rights
Countries that infringe the eurozone rules should have their voting rights suspended for at least a year. This includes countries that ignore recommendations to reduce deficits or manipulate official statistics. 

Improved economic policy surveillance and co-ordination
There should be a review of competitiveness with a focus on uncompetitive member states. Member states bear the primary responsibility for adhering to and implementing the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). Member states should develop a stringent and politically visible procedure, in which infringements of the BEPGs are flagged up at an early stage and clear, binding recommendations are set out. The procedure should gradually increase the pressure on member states that have failed to observe the rules and provide for sanctions in case of serious infringements.

Permanent crisis-resolution mechanism
If further measures to stabilise the eurozone are needed once the three-year eurozone stabilisation mechanism expires, there should be a procedure for orderly state insolvencies as an integral part of any fixed crisis-resolution framework for the eurozone.