Moldova's parliament, reconstituted after a disputed election on 5 April, is to choose a new president today (20 May). The choice is not simply about who should lead Europe's poorest country for the next four years. It is also about whether the ruling Communists will be able to sit out the storm that gathered after the elections, which the three opposition parties – by and large liberal and pro-Romanian – described as fraudulent. Additionally, it is about the European Union's ability to effect change in a neighbouring state.
The violence that followed the parliamentary election last month brings all of these questions into sharp relief. The Communists, led by outgoing President Vladimir Voronin, are, with 60 deputies, short of one vote in the parliament to elect their candidate, Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii. The 41 opposition lawmakers are poised (or posturing) to boycott the vote – but observers suggest that there is intense bargaining going on behind the scenes.
If this results in a deal, on what grounds could the EU reject it? Any deal that is good enough for Moldova's parties – which all have a level of democratic legitimacy, give or take a seat or two – should be good enough for the EU, the realists say. Why threaten fragile political stability by taking a high moral road that even Moldova's opposition does not want to take? European decision-makers are afraid of the kind of political instability that has plagued Moldova's giant neighbour, Ukraine, for the last several years. The most severe economic crisis in generations is probably not the best moment for an experiment in democracy, they say.
A stable government that can focus on its job is an absolute precondition for negotiating and implementing the painful adjustment measures mandated by an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – an agreement that Moldova desperately needs.
There is much political wisdom in such a stance. But it also contains an element of hypocrisy and cynicism. Sanctions of any kind would probably be both ineffectual (forcing Moldova back into Moscow's embrace) and morally dubious. But Moldova is eager to negotiate an association agreement with the EU and talks are scheduled to begin on 16 June.
The EU's member states have yet to approve the negotiating mandate for the European Commission, a draft of which is in essence stuck at the Council of Ministers. A smooth presidential election today is probably the one event that could make the draft move again. But is it wise to give Moldova something – the start of talks – in exchange for nothing? A smooth election, even if achieved through concessions to the opposition, is in Voronin's interest. (After two terms in office, he cannot stand again. He was elected speaker of parliament last week, on 12 May.) But it would not signal a breakthrough for democracy or good governance in Moldova.
What the EU should do instead of imposing sanctions or doing nothing is to link every step towards closer ties with Moldova to specific benchmarks. It should not negotiate with a regime that unleashed police brutality on pro-democracy protesters – resulting in several deaths – unless those responsible are called to account.
An investigation into the post-election violence is needed and has to result in prosecutions where appropriate. The EU should support the opposition as it seeks some form of redress on the electoral front, rather than side with a government that stole the vote. Greater participation of opposition figures in decision-making or a partial or full re-run of the disputed election could constitute remedies.
For the EU to point to the IMF as a reason why this should not happen now is short-sighted. Any government that wants to implement austerity measures has to be certain of its democratic legitimacy – or of its ability to suppress dissent. Moldova today is at a curious stage where the government cannot be sure of either.
